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NOTES ON RECENT CASES
of an "intent" on the part of the drawer." The Terrill case would seem to fall
within the second group set out, i.e., where the act of the drawer was the sole
cause of the loss.
The fact situation in the main case clearly falls into the "in-between" group.
The solution of the problem in such a case depends largely upon the legal effect
of the acts of the drawer, payee, and drawee. The court must determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to invoke an stoppel. It is submitted that in the
Keck case, the facts were not sufficient to eston the drawer, and that the loss
should have been placed, on the paving bank.
ROBERT F STEPHENS
IMPUTATION OF NEGLIGENCE BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE-
HALE V HALE
The doctrine of imputed negligence, originated in the English case of
Thorogood v. Bryan,' is said to be based upon the idea that such a relationship
may exist between an injured person and another that it would be inequitable
to permit the injured person to recover where the other party to the relationship
was negligent. Can it be said that under this theory the marital relationship,
standing alone, is sufficient for the imputation of negligence of one spouse to
another? This very question was raised in the recent Kentucky case of Hale
v. Hale.-
In that case, a child was killed when, due to the negligent driving of her
father, the station wagon in which the family was riding went over an embank-
ment. Suit was brought against the father by the admimstrator of the child's
estate, for the benefit of the mother. Defendant's demurrer was sustained in
lower court; the Court of Appeals reversed. There were two grounds of de-
fense. The first, the common law disability of one spouse to sue another. was
disposed of by the court with the observation that the Kentucky Constitution'
expressl, provides that the action may be maintained in every case by the
administrator of the decedent, and for the benefit of those named m the statute.'
The second defense, and the one in which we are primarily interested, was that
the negligence of the father should be imputed to the mother, so as to bar re-
covery for the benefit of the mother by the child's adminstrator. Plaintiff con-
tended that the sounder and more modern rule is that negligence will not be
imputed on the basis of the marital relationship alone. The Court of Appeals,
in discussing the problem said:
"The question of imputed negligence is not a new one,
the decisions in this state and elsewhere are somewhat in conflict.
The better rule is that negligence is not to be imputed by reason
of the marital relation alone."'
"BnrroN, BiLS AND Nom~s 720 (1943).
18 C. B. 115, 18 L. C. P. 336 (1849); See Keeton, Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 13 TEx. L. REv. 161 (1935).
312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W 2d 610 (1950).
'Ky. CoNST. sec. 241.
'Ky. REv. STAT. see. 411.130 (1948).
'Supra, note 2, at 870.
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After setting out the above rule, the court then turned its attention to cases
taking an apparently opposite view of the matter. It said:
"In these cases it was held that where a child is killed
due to the negligence of a third party and one of its parents is con-
tributorily negligent in permitting the child to be in a place of danger,
such contributory negligence will be imputed to the other parent.
Such cases rest on a theory of agency as between husband and wife
in the control of the child in such a situation; but these holdings are
clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. We are not disposed
to extend the rule imputing negligence as between husband and wife
any further than the bare limits of the situations involved in those
cases. Unless there be something more shown than the marital rela-
tion or a parent-child relation, negligence should not be imputed by
the modern view as followed by most courts, including this court."'6
In so far as the court says only that it is not disposed to extend the rule im-
puting negligence as between husband and wife any further than the bare limits
of the Kentucky cases-brought to its attention, and since it admits the conflict in
those cases and fails to differentiate those situations upon sound reasomng, the
opinion in the Hale case perhaps falls short of what might be desired.
The primary purpose of this note will be to consider the Hale case in two
aspects. First, how does the result fit in with the general law on imputation of
negligence between husband and wife where one of the parents alone has con-
tributed to the death or injurv of the child. Second, how does the result fit in
with allied Kentucky cases which have raised the problem, a situation which can
best be clarified by an analytical discussion of those cases.
In a case almost like the principal case, O'Connor v. Benson Coal Co., a child
met her death as a result of being run over bv a truck driven by her father, who
was acting within the scope of his employment as a driver. The suit was brought
under a wrongful death statute,s by the mother as administrator against the father s
employer, upon principles of agency.' The question arose as to whether the
mother could recover, since the father, as one of the next of kin, would share in
the estate. The court decided that the negligence of one beneficiary would not
bar innocent beneficiaries from recovery. In effect, an application of the doctrine
of imputed negligence was refused, at least upon a mere husband and wife
relationship. Had the wife been suing the husband, and not the employer, the
result undoubtedly would have been the same, since there is no more basis for
imputing negligence when the employee-husband is being sued than when the
employer himself is being sued.
The only other cases which could be found were those in which the parent
had been only contributorily negligent and the party sued was a third party who
had killed or injured the child and the suit by the parent was for loss of services.
In these cases, it is said that the theory of the plaintiff's action is that he has an
independent right, and is suing for the invasion of his own interest' Most courts
apply the same rule in the case of injury to the child as is applied where the child
has been killed. If one parent has been guilty of contributory negligence, the
Ibzd.
301 Mass. 145, 16 N.E. 2d 636, 637 (1938).
'II MASS. GEN. LAws c. 229, sec. 5 (1932).
REsTAT ENT, AGENCY see. 217, comment [b] (1933).
"oPRossEn, TORTS sec. 421 (1941).
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other parent is not barred on the basis of the marital relationship alone,' except
where the community property system prevails.'2
The conclusion reached by the writer is that the decision in the Hale case is
not inconsistent with what little case authority could be located in other junsdic
tions pertinent to the problem raised by the peculiar facts of the Hale case. It
seems to be sound in so far as it is said to be based upon the majority rule that
the negligence of the husband wi]l not be imputed to the wife, or vice-versa, on
the basis of the marital relationship alone.' The reason for the contrary rule has
long since been rebutted in most jurisdictions.
1
4
In summary, the general rule is that where one parent is suing the other
parent or his employer for the negligent killing or injuring of the child, or where
one parent is sung a third party for the death or injury of a child and the other
parent has been contributorily negligent, the doctrine of imputed negligence should
not be applied upon the fact alone that the plaintiff and the negligent parent
were husband and wife.
The Kentucky cases on imputed negligence which raise the particular prob-
lem of the husband and wife relationship fall into three factual categones. The
first includes the situation in the Hale case, where the suit is brought by one par-
ent against the other parent who killed their child. The second involves a suit
by one acting as admimstrator of his or her child's estate, against a third person
who killed the child and who pleads, as a defense, the contributory negligence of
the other parent. The third is made up of those cases where one spouse brings
suit for personal injuries to himself inflicted by a third party who pleads the con-
tributory negligence of the other spouse as a defense. Although these cases differ
in that no children are involved, the imputation of negligence problem is still
present.
In all cases of class two described above the court has demed recovery. In
the parent-child cases it seems that the marital relation alone had no bearing at
all upon the imputation of negligence from one spouse to another. Rather the
Court of Appeals has emphasized the legal duty of parents to care for their chil-
dren.'5 Where the child has been in the actual custody of the parent, it has im-
puted the contributory negligence of the parent in custody of the child, to the
other parent." On the other hand, it has also imputed the contributory negligence
"139 Aii. Jur. 729. But see Connelly v. Kaufman & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 261, 37
A. 2d 125 (1944).
"Basler v. Sacramento Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 514, 111 Pac. 530, Ann.
Cases 1912A; McFadden v. Santa, 0. & T. St. Ry. Co., 187 Cal. 464, 25 Pac. 681,
11 L. R. A. 252.
" 38 Am!. Jun. 925; 16 Am. Jun. 93; 65 C. J. S. 800; PRossER, TORTs at p. 421
(1941); Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 TEx. L. REV. 161. (1934-
35); Note, 13 CENT. L. J. 384 (1881); Note, 3 Mo. L. REv. 78 (1938); See Note,
23 A. L. R. 691 (1923); See Note, 110 A. L. R. 1099 (1937).
"See Lomsville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Creek, 130 Ind. 139, 29 N.E. 481,
14 L.R.A. 733 (1892); Accord Town of Knightstown v. Musgrove, 116 Ind. 121,
18 N.E. 452.
" Lomsville & Portland fly. Co. v. Murphy s Adm r., 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 522,
531 (1872). "Parents are the legal and natural custodians of their children, and
when the children are so young as to not be capable of exercising any discretion
their parents must exercise it for them."
'5 Mill's Adm r. v. Cavannaugh, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 685, 94 S.W 651 (1906)
(child drowned in well on prermses leased by parents); Toner s Adm r v. South
Covington & Cincinnati St. fy. Co., 109 Ky. 41, 58 S.W 439 (1900) (child in
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of a nurse or sister in custody of the child, to both parents." In both situations it
is the custody-agency relation which is stressed, not the husband-wife relation.
Using this as a basis, the court has justified its result in each case by saying that
under the statute, 8 a recovery would be for the benefit of both parents, one moeity
to each." To permit this would be to allow the guilty parent to profit by his or
her wrong.
In the third group of cases, involving a suit by one spouse against a third
party for personal injuries to himself, the Court of Appeals has refused to impute
negligence,' with the exception of two cases, in both of which an agency relation
of master and servant was found.2L
The view of the court is best expressed in Louisville Ry. v. McCarthy." There
the plaintiff was riding with her husband in their carnage and the defendant's
streetcar struck the carnage, throwing the plaintiff to the ground. The lower
court instructed that the plaintiff was responsible only for her own negligence,
and not for the contributory negligence of her husband. The upper court said
that this presents squarely, the question of whether the negligence of the hus-
band can be imputed to the wife while driving a vehicle in which the wife was
passenger, and whether or not the relation of husband and wife is such that the
wife cannot recover under such facts if the husband was negligent. In affirming
for the plaintiff, the court flatly stated the rule to be that the mere fact of a hus-
band and wife relationship should not render one spouse answerable in the negli-
gence of the other. It said:
"It seems to us that this rule is in consonance with reason
and justice; that the negligence of the husband or the wife, as the
case may be, should not be attributable to or charged to the other,
unless it should appear that in that particular instance the relation
of principal and agent or master and servant existed between them.
The husband has no interest in the recovery, and we see no
good reason for denying to a wife the right of a recovery because her
husband, into whose car she, for the time being, intrusted herself, was
guilty of an act of negligence which contributed to bring about her
injury."
It should be noted that the guilty spouse will not benefit from a recovery here
and thus the problem of the preceding cases did not inder the court in reaching
a decision in favor of the injured spouse.
mothers custody, broke away and ran into street); See Brown McClain Transfer
Co. v. Major s Admr., 251 Ky. 741, 745, 65 S.W 2d 992, 994 (1933).
" Wheat's Adm r. v. Gray, 309 Ky. 593, 218 S.W 2d 40Q, 7 L.R.A. 1336
(1949) (child in sister s care, ran into path of defendant's car).
"Ky. REv. STAT. see. 411.130 (2) (d) (1948). "If the deceased leaves no
widow, husband or child, then the recovery shall pass to the father and mother,
one moiety to each."
"Toner s Adm r v. The South Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 109 Ky. 41,
58 S.W 439 (1900), wherein the court asserted that, "Under the statute, a re-
covery in this case, if had, would go to the father and mother, one moiety to each."
'Creal v. U.S., 84 Fed. Supp. 249 (1949); Sweazy v. King, 248 Ky. 432, 58
S.W 2d 659 (1933); Cox s Adm r v. Cin. New Orleans & Texas Pac. Ry. Co., 238
Ky. 312, 37 S.W 2d 859 (1931); Ray v. Ray, 196 Ky. 579, 245 S.W 287 (1922);
City of Louisville v. Zoeller, 155 Ky 192, 160 S.W 500 (1913); Louisville Ry. v.
McCathy, 129 Ky. 814, 112 S.W 925 (1908).
21 Challinor v. Axton, 246 Ky. 76, 54 S.W 2d 636 (1932); Standard Oil Co.
of Ky. v. Thompson, 189 Ky 830, 226 S.W 368 (1920).
=-129 Ky. 814, 112 S.W 925 (1908).
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However, in Challinor v. Axton,' it might be asked whether the rule followed
in previous decisions is not repudiated. The wife owned a car which was being
dnven by her husband. A collision occurred as the car was being turned into
the driveway of the joint home of the plantiff and her husband. The lower court's
instruction imputed the negligence of the husband to the wife. Since plaintiff
counsel had offered an instruction which did the same thing, plaintiff could not
complain. But, the upper court further stated that the instruction, in its opimon,
was correct. Since the auto was owned by the wife and was being driven by
the husband with her consent and acquiescence on a mission as much for her bene-
fit as for his or the children s, the court said it had no trouble in imputing the
negligence of the husband to plaintiff, independently of any family purpose
doctrine.
The court found further support in the argument that the plaintiff did consent
to the husband dnving, and selected her husband as a suitable person, not only
to operate the car for her own purpose, but also to guard and protect her personal
safety while traveling in her car with him as dnver. Also, since the negligence
of a chauffeur would be imputed to her, the same pnnciples should apply when
the selected chauffeur is her husband. In so far as the court based the decision
upon a master and servant relation by analogy to the chauffeur relation, the result
seems questionable. What seems to have impressed the court most was the own-
ership of the car by the wife. Other than this, the facts appear no different from
those cases already referred to, in which the negligence was not imputable. It is
submitted that although the result reached appears to be questionable, the court
did not look upon its decision as a repudiation of the rule already set out, but
rather as an exception to that rule based upon agency pnnciples which the court
has made use of before.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Thompson,=' the only difference in the facts, was that
the wife was driving the car for her invalid husband. He was injured when the
car collided with defendant's truck. Without elaboration upon the facts estab-
lishing the agency relationship, the court said at the close of its opinion:
"Appellee [plaintiff] is chargeable with the negligence of
his wife, who was ins agent in the operation of ins automobile at the
time of the collision." =
Thus, tis is not a modification of the stated rule, but an exception to it based
upon an agency relationship.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis-there can be no doubt that if the question in the Hale
case is considered as being one of the imputation of negligence between the hus-
band and wife based upon the marital relationship alone, the case can be said to
be in consonance with allied Kentucky cases. Where one spouse is injured or
killed, and the other spouse has been contributorily negligent, recovery by the
injured spouse or his administrator will be denied only where an agency relation
is established. Where recovery is sought by an administrator for the estate of a
deceased child, the court has found an agency relation based upon the custody
- ,46 Ky. 76, 54 S.W 2d 600 (1932).
2'189 Ky. 880, 226 S.W 868 (1920).1 Id. at 834, S.W at 370.
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of the child and has imputed the negligence of one parent to the other, probably
because, under the wrongful death statute, both parents will benefit. How does
the court logically distinguish the Hale case from these parent-child cases upon
the custody question? The court does not try to make distinction, and there
seems to be no logical one. It merely says that those cases are clearly distin-
gmshable from this case.
It is submitted that in the Hale case the Court of Appeals seems to re-
pudiate the custody-agency concept of the parent-child cases by refusing to
utilize agency principles for imputing the negligence of the careless father to
the plaintiff mother, the court permits the mother to recover the amount to
which she is entitled, while at the same time the father can recover nothing.
This case points the way to a reversal of the Kentucky doctrine which m
the parent-child-custody situation has been used to bar recovery under our
statute.2' A majority of jurisdictions have applied a less harsh rule in those
cases barrng recovery only to the extent that it will inure to the benefit of the
negligent parent-beneficiary.'
CECIL D. WALDEN
TAX SITUS OF RIVER BOATS IN A NON-DOMICILIARY STATE -
REEVES V ISLAND CREEK FUEL AND TRANSPORTATION CO.
A case recently decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals seems to im-
port an extension of the principles now used to determine the tax situs of
river boats and barges in a non-domiciliary state. In Reeves v. Island Creek
Fuel and Transportation Co.,' the Commonwealth of Kentucky instituted omitted
tax assessment proceedings in the courts of certain counties bordering the Oluo
River to assess and collect from the appellee ad valorem property taxes on niver
boats and barges. Appellee obtained a permanent injunction enjoimng further
prosecution, and this appeal was taken. The Island Creek Co., a Maine cor-
poration, was almost exclusively engaged in shipping coal by barge on the Ohio
River between Huntington, West Virgima, and Cincinnati, Ohio, on behalf of
its parent company. Although the domiciliary state was Maine, the boats and
barges had never been there, nor was there any prospect of their being there m
the future. The company had operated its two tugs and fifty-four barges over
this route, which is 94.6% in Kentucky,- during the years m question with rela-
Unless this is true the Kentucky court finds itself faced with a curious
anomaly. Where a father kills is child, recovery is allowed. Where a third party
kills the child and the father is negligent a recovery is demed. It is possible that
considerations of "policy" lead the Court of Appeals to such a result. If a suit is
brought against a parent for a negligent injury, an insurance company mdemnitor
is no doubt always in the background, and the burden of payment of the judgment
is spread. This might not be true where the defendant is a third party.
See Note, 2 A. L. R. 2d 785, at 799.
313 Ky. 400, 230 S.W 2d 924 (1950).
This case seems to be decided in terms of route mileage. However, the ac-
tual mileage traveled in Kentucky bore the same proportionate relationslp to the
total mileage traveled as that part of the route in Kentucky bore to the full route.
See brief on behalf of Campbell County, Kentucky, as anncus curiae, page 39.
Had this not been reasonably true the result might have been unfair, or might well
have been different.
